In June 2003, the OAS General
"... to urge all parties to take part in the formation of a credible,
neutral and independent Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) when a climate
of security conducive to free, fair and transparent elections has been
created." ( See, OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 1959 (XXXIII-O/03)
of June 10, 2003: Support for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti and Amnesty
International's "Haiti Abuse of human rights: political violence
as the 200th anniversary of independence approaches.")
But when, from February
29, 2004 to May 2006, after the foreign ouster of Haiti's democratically
elected government anarchy reigned supreme in Haiti, and the U.S. and
its U.N. and OAS surrogates wished to solidify their bicentennial coup
detat gains with (s)elections, there was scant OAS concerned the 2006-elections-under-occupation
should be free, fair and transparent.
That is, even though most of the leaders of Haiti's most popular political
party where in prison, in exile, indefinitely incarcerated as political
prisoners or being hunted down by coup d'etat death squads and the restructed-by-foreigners-Haitian-police.
The OAS, in fact, cheered on the exclusion of Haiti's masses from the
elections by giving contracts (printing and for digital voting machines)
for the elections to the Haitian coup detat implementers - the Boulos
and Apaid families. No OAS 822-like resolution expressed concerned that
"all parties take part in the formation a credible, neutral and
independent Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)."
Indeed, the OAS, UN and US made sure that the CEP was stacked with coup
d'etat sympathizers and orchestrators and headed by an illegal executive
director, Jacques Bernard. Fraudulent and illegitimate was imposed on
Haitians, first through the impositions of the Latortue Boca Raton Regime
and then through rendering President Rene Preval a puppet with the Haitian
Supreme Court, police, legislature, his cabinet and foreign ministries
stacked with coup d'etat collaborators while 9,000 foreign troops aimed
their guns at Haiti's head should these collaborators be fired and denounced
by the elected President and Haitian majority. (See, "Who
Benefits from the disappearance of Lovinsky Pierre Antoine."
That was "the climate of security" this white world had been
planning for fourteen years. They had destabilized Haiti's duly elected
governments through countless diplomatic tools like OAS resolutions,
through a humanitarian embargo, media disinformation and propaganda,
by financing anti-democratic opponents with no significant popular support
and other such morally reprehensible tactics.
was shown in several Haiti Progres articles, that:
time the opposition made an excuse, no matter how patently absurd,
the U.S. government agreed with them and put more pressure on
Aristide and his government. The international community, led
by the U.S. and the OAS as their surrogate, for example, required
the Haitian government to pay millions of dollars in restitution
to opposition parties arising out of the attempted December
17th (2001) coup (during which opposition commandos briefly
took over the National Palace) ...The opposition was never pressured
to take any steps required under the OAS resolution..."
(822 passed by OAS General Assembly,
September, 2002) - excerpted
February 29th Coup d’Etat Against President Jean Bertrand
Aristide and the Role of the United States in the Coup (Second
of two articles)", Haiti Progres, March 24,
"...Also, echoing last January’s Res. 806, Res.
822 demands that the Haitian government disarm its partisans
with "the active cooperation of the International Community"
and undertake the "effective prosecution of any person,
and dismissal, when appropriate, of any person found to be author
of or accomplice in the violence of Dec. 17, 2001, and subsequent
days." On that date, government partisans burned and looted
opposition leaders’ homes and headquarters following an
unsuccessful attempted assassination of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide by a 30-man armed commando unit (see Haïti Progrès,
Vol. 19, No. 40, 1/19/2001).
The penniless Haitian government is also commanded to undertake
"prompt reparation for organizations and individuals who
suffered damages as a direct result of the violence." (OAS
Resolution Augurs Return of Foreign Troops Not Aid,
Haiti Progres, Sept. 11, 2002
"...Furthermore, last week, David Lee, the
Canadian OAS special representative to Haiti, scolded the Haitian
government that there "is still much to do" in implementing
Res. 822, in particular the round-up and disarmament of government
supporters who ransacked opposition homes and headquarters on
Dec. 17, 2001, following an assassination attempt on President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Lee called the pursuit of Dec. 17 rioters
outlined last month in a Haitian Justice Ministry preliminary
report"fictitious" and reminded the government that
its treasury-emptying compensation of opposition leaders with
millions of gourdes "is not yet completed."
with U.S. Arrogance, New Popular Movement Grows,
Haiti Progres, Oct. 16, 2002)
"...Res. 822, passed on Sep. 4, represents
just one more loop in the noose being tightened around Haiti’s
It is the latest in a series of OAS resolutions over the past
two years maneuvering the Inter-American Democratic Charter
into place to be invoked against Haiti, if necessary. The Democratic
Charter is a hemispheric accord, approved one year ago, which
empowers the OAS to take action against any member state which
deviates from Washington’s definition of democracy (see
Haïti Progrès, Vol. 19, No. 44, 1/16/2002)
RESOLUTION ON HOLDING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN HAITI AND
RESOLVING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Original version: French
Whereas FIPA is aware of the extreme gravity of the economic and political
situation in Haiti;
Whereas OAS Resolution 822 contains the essential elements for resolving
crisis in Haiti;
Be it resolved that: the Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas,
1. Supports intensification of the negotiations between international
organizations and the Haitian government with the support of all parties
concerned, without prior political conditions regarding the holding
election pursuant to OAS Resolution 822 (1331/02);
2. Supports the holding of democratic
elections and encourages the
provision of technical assistance by the international community;
3. Strongly encourages all parties concerned to participate actively
implementing Resolution 822 so that democratic elections can be held
2003, and makes a commitment to support the efforts of all parties
concerned to achieve this goal as soon as possible.
SUPPORT FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
DEEPLY CONCERNED by the continuing political crisis in Haiti
resulting from the elections of May 21, 2000;
HAVING CONSIDERED the extensive efforts by the OAS
and CARICOM to
contribute to resolution of that crisis and the numerous missions that
organizations have dispatched to Haiti to facilitate agreement on a
accord, without having reached a satisfactory solution;
HAVING SEEN the Sixth Report of the Mission of the
Organization of American
States to Haiti on the OAS-CARICOM mission to Haiti from July 5 to 10,
(CP/doc. 3625/02 corr. 3), headed by the Assistant Secretary General,
Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saint
Honorable Julian Hunte, in his capacity as CARICOM representative, and
Report of the Secretary General In Response to CP/INF. 4724/02
(CP/doc.3643/02 corr. 1);
HAVING NOTED in those documents the respective positions
of the Government
of Haiti and Convergence Democratique with regard to the Draft Initial
submitted by the OAS and CARICOM negotiators on June 12, 2002;
RECOGNIZING that Fanmi Lavalas and Convergence Democratique
agreed on the need for elections in 2003 and on the formation of the
Electoral Council (CEP), as well as on its composition and on arrangements
appointment of its members, as set forth in the OAS Draft Initial Accord
of June 12, 2002;
RECALLING resolutions CP/RES. 772 (1247/02) of August
4, 2000; CP/RES.
786 (1267/01) corr. 2, of March 19, 2001; AG/RES. 1831 (XXXI-O/01) of
2001; CP/RES. 806 (1303/02), corr. 1, of January 15, 2002; and AG/RES.
(XXXII-O/02), of June 4, 2002;
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the steps the Government of Haiti has taken
comply with these resolutions, as stated in the Report of the Secretary
General In Response to CP/INF. 4724/02 (CP/doc.3643/02 corr. 1);
BEARING IN MIND:
That the Special Mission of the Organization of American States to Strengthen
Democracy in Haiti has been deployed and is pursuing its activities
accordance with resolution CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) corr. 1;
That the independent Commission of Inquiry has submitted its report
events of December 17, 2001, and that the Government of Haiti has committed
to implement the recommendations made in this report;
That on July 10, 2002, the Government of Haiti and the victims of the
December 17, 2001, signed a protocol of agreement on the payment of
reparations and that the Government of Haiti has committed itself to
payment to each victim based on procedures established by the OAS Advisory
Council on Reparations;
That the Government of Haiti has proposed that free, fair and technically
feasible legislative and local elections be held in the first half of
Of the need to normalize the functioning of democratic institutions
in Haiti and to strengthen them, in keeping with the spirit and principles
of the Charter of the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
and that for this purpose the OAS will continue to use its good offices
That preparations must begin soon for free, fair and technically feasible
legislative and local elections in 2003;
That dialogue and consensus-building measures are necessary to help
guarantee a peaceful and democratic solution to the political crisis
That the Inter-American Democratic Charter proclaims that "the
peoples of the
Americas have a right to democracy and that their governments have an
obligation to promote and defend it;" and that "essential
elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for
human rights and
fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance
the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based
balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty
of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations,
separation of powers and independence of the branches of government";
That the Inter-American Democratic Charter also states that "democracy
social and economic development are interdependent and are mutually
reinforcing" and that the "promotion and observance of economic,
cultural rights are inherently linked to integral development, equitable
growth, and to the consolidation of democracy in the states of the Hemisphere";
DEEPLY CONCERNED by the continuing deterioration of the socioeconomic
situation in Haiti, the ongoing suffering of the people, and its potential
humanitarian disaster and convinced that efforts must be made, as a
urgency, to alleviate these conditions;
1.To take note of the Sixth Report of the Mission of
the Organization of American States to Haiti (CP/doc. 3625/02 corr.
3) concerning the joint OAS/CARICOM efforts to facilitate a solution
to the political crisis in Haiti, and to thank the OAS Secretary General,
the Assistant Secretary General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Saint Lucia in his capacity as Representative of
CARICOM for their initiatives in this regard.
2. To take note of the report of the Commission of
Inquiry and to thank the Commission and the Advisory Council on Reparations
for their diligent efforts in
contributing to a peaceful resolution of the political crisis in Haiti.
3. To welcome the Government of Haiti's expressed commitment
to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry as well
as the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Reparations, as reflected
in the Accord signed by the Minister of Justice, Claimants and their
Representatives on July 9, 2002, and to call on the Government of Haiti
to do so as soon as possible.
4. To further welcome the Government of Haiti's pledge
to undertake additional
confidence building measures, bearing in mind that some elements can
be implemented more expeditiously than others and that additional financial
and technical assistance may be necessary. These measures include:
a. To publish within 60 days of receipt of the Commission
of Inquiry Report a report by the Minister of Justice on actions taken
with respect to persons found to be implicated in the events of December
17, 2001 and subsequent days;
b. To strengthen its disarmament policies and programs
and, in this regard, invite the active cooperation of the International
Community, through the OAS Special Mission, in the development and implementation
of a comprehensive disarmament program;
c. To implement, to the fullest extent of its lawful
authority, all the Recommendations on Human Rights and the Press set
forth in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of
December 17, 2001, and all other Recommendations in the Report that
are, in whole or in part, directed to it.
5. To recognize, as noted in the report of the Secretary
General of August 20,
2002 (CP/doc. 3643/02 corr. 1), the positive steps that the Government
of Haiti has taken to date to implement Permanent Council resolution
(1303/02) corr. 1 and to support and urge it to implement fully all
elements of that resolution as soon as possible, bearing in mind that
elements can be implemented more expeditiously than others and that
additional financial and technical assistance may be necessary.
These include in particular:
a. The restoration of a climate of security;
b. The effective prosecution of any person, and dismissal,
when appropriate, of any person found to be author of or accomplice
in the violence of December 17, 2001, and subsequent days;
c. The completion of a thorough inquiry into all politically-motivated
d. Prompt reparation for organizations and individuals who suffered
damages as a direct result of the violence of December 17, 2001.
6. To urge the Government of Haiti that, with a view
to establishing the
conditions for elections to be held in 2003, it renew efforts to ensure
a climate of security and confidence within the parameters established
in operative paragraph
5 of AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02), bearing in mind the
need to strengthen
independent police and judicial institutions as part of its renewed
combat impunity as called for in paragraph 6 of AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02).
7. To reaffirm the importance of holding free, fair,
and technically feasible
legislative and local elections-on a date in 2003 to be established
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)--in which all political parties
freely and securely. The conduct of these elections shall take into
consideration the Government of Haiti's constitutional electoral prerogatives
and shall be in accordance with the process proposed by the OAS in the
Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9) of June 12, 2002, which includes:
a. The formation of an autonomous, independent, credible and neutral
CEP) no later than two months after adoption of this resolution;
b. The establishment by the CEP, within the parameters of Haitian law
and no later than 30 days after the formation of the CEP, of a Electoral
Guarantees Commission (CGE), which shall be comprised of, inter alia,
representatives of a national coordination body formed on the basis
of experience of coordinating electoral observation in Haiti and of
civil society organizations, and witnessed by representatives of electoral
observation missions and the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy
in Haiti ;
c. The monitoring by the CEP of the activities of the police in connection
with the electoral process.
8. To further recognize the urgency of forming the
CEP, in accordance with the
process proposed by the OAS in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9) of
2002, no later than two months after adoption of this resolution.
9. To offer the Government of Haiti, political parties,
and civil society the support and technical assistance of the Organization
of American States that is required to facilitate the process of forming
the CEP and preparing for and holding these elections.
10. To encourage all Haitian parties to participate
in all relevant aspects of those elections and in the electoral process
leading up to it.
11. To support normalization of economic cooperation between the
Government of Haiti and the international financial institutions and
parties to resolve the technical and financial obstacles that preclude
12. To reaffirm the mandates of the Secretary General and the OAS Special
Mission in accordance with AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02),
AG/RES. 1831 (XXXI-
O/01), and CP/RES. 806 (1303/02 corr. 1) and to instruct
the Secretary General to strengthen further the Special OAS Mission
to Haiti in order for it to support, monitor, and report on implementation
of this and all other pertinent OAS resolutions and on commitments of
the Government of Haiti, as set forth in these resolutions and in accordance
with the agreement between the Government of Haiti and the OAS on the
Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti.
These commitments include:
a. Strengthening of democratic institutions, including political parties,
in order to guarantee a pluralistic political party system;
b. Formation of a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), in accordance
with the process proposed by the OAS in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev.
9) of June 12, 2002, and all of the CEP's activities;
c. Establishment by the CEP of an Electoral Guarantees Commission (CGE);
d. Development and implementation of a comprehensive disarmament program;
e. Promotion of a National Dialogue and Consensus Building between the
Government of Haiti, all political parties, and Haitian civil society;
f. Professional development of an independent police institution, development
of a security plan and creation of a climate of security for the 2003
13. The OAS Special Mission
a. Support, monitor, and report on provision by the international community
and the OAS of technical electoral assistance prior to and following
the 2003 elections and on deployment of an electoral observation mission
to observe all aspects of the electoral process;
b. Coordinate efforts of the international community to provide technical
and financial electoral assistance, including electoral planning, technical
assistance, security, and observation of the elections in 2003.
14. To call on the Secretary General to remain engaged in efforts to
the political crisis in Haiti, to follow the evolution of the situation,
and to submit to the Permanent Council every two months detailed reports
regarding the implementation of the present resolution.
15. To call on the international community to provide as a matter of
additional funds to the OAS Special Mission in order to help finance
its economic, social and institutional strengthening programs for Haiti,
with a view to discharging its additional responsibilities under this
16. To further call on the international community to provide technical
and financial support for the elections in 2003, particularly by observing
electoral formation and operation of the CEP and post-electoral operations,
well as the elections themselves.
State Department, October
Ambassador Roger F. Noriega, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS
Presentation to the Inter-American Dialogue
October 30, 2002
Thank you for your kind introduction. I welcome the opportunity to address
the distinguished members and guests of the Inter-American Dialogue
today. Since its formation in the early 1980s, this organization has
done much to bring understanding to important problems facing the Western
Hemisphere. It has helped to shape the agenda of issues and policy choices
on inter-American relations.
Today I want to share with you some thoughts on Haiti.
Of course, the United States is concerned about what is happening in
Haiti. As Americans, we appreciate Haiti's vibrant culture and the resiliency
of its people. We feel a historic kinship that arises from our shared
struggles for independence and, more practically, from the hundreds
of thousands of Haitians now living and working in the United States.
And yet - despite all the resources the international community, including
the United States, has devoted to assist the Haitian people - extraordinary
This has not deterred our government from continuing to help the Haitian
people, nor should it deter the international community from doing so.
However, it does mean that we must speak openly about what these problems
are and state frankly our views about how Haiti can best solve them.
And a candid, open discussion requires me to say that we have very serious
concerns about the leadership of Jean Bertrand Aristide.
Let us start by looking at Haitian government efforts to comply with
OAS Resolutions 806 and 822. (emphasis added by HLLN)
The record of Haitian government compliance with these resolutions thus
far is frankly discouraging.
Resolution 806 was adopted January 16, 2002 by the OAS in direct response
to the violent events of July 28 and December 17, 2001.
On July 28, 2001, simultaneous attacks on the National Police Academy
and police stations in different parts of the country resulted in several
deaths, including a number of police officers.
On December 17, the National Palace was attacked and part of it briefly
occupied by the attackers. Also that day, in a series of coordinated
incidents in Port-au-Prince and other cities, attackers ransacked and
burned the offices of opposition political parties, and damaged or destroyed
the residences of some members of the opposition.
These violent incidents last July and December substantially impeded
efforts, led by the OAS, to broker an accord between Fanmi Lavalas and
the opposition settling the dispute that followed the elections in May
2000. Resolution 806 called on the Haitian government to diligently
pursue all efforts to restore a climate of security. In particular,
Resolution 806 among other things required:
-- completion of a thorough, independent inquiry into the events related
-- prosecution of any person and dismissal, where appropriate, of any
government official found to be complicit in the Dec. 17 violence;
-- completion of a thorough inquiry into all politically-motivated crimes;
-- reparations for organizations and individuals who suffered damages
as a direct result of the violence of Dec. 17.
The OAS subsequently adopted Resolution 822 on September 4, 2002. In
doing so, it incorporated by reference the provisions of Res. 806 and
specifically reiterated the requirements of that resolution, as I have
just described them. In addition, it incorporated new commitments made
by the Haitian government, including:
-- publishing a report on actions taken with respect to persons found
to be implicated in the events of December 17;
-- strengthening disarmament policies and programs; and
-- implementing to the fullest extent possible recommendations on improving
human rights and protecting the press, as made by the OAS Commission
of Inquiry Report into the events of December 17.
Resolution 822 also called on the Haitian Government to ensure a climate
of security and confidence with a view to establishing the conditions
necessary for free and fair elections in 2003. It established November
4 as the date by which autonomous, credible, and neutral Provisional
Electoral Council should be formed.
The United States gave its full support to OAS Resolution 822. Indeed,
along with Canada, CARICOM, and others, we were instrumental in facilitating
negotiations that produced unanimous adoption of 822 at the OAS.
Full Haitian government compliance with Resolutions 806 and 822 is essential.
November 4 is coming up fast. That is the date projected under Resolution
822 for formation of the Provisional Electoral Council. All concerned
parties - the opposition, the international community, NGOs, and most
importantly the Haitian people - are looking to the Haitian government
for concrete progress as that date approaches.
Unfortunately, the Haitian government has not met its commitments.
The OAS did conduct an independent inquiry into the events of Dec. 17,
and - yes - the Haitian government did cooperate in that effort. However,
the government has yet to produce its own final report on Dec. 17 as
required by Resolution 822 and has yet to initiate any prosecutions.
Moreover, inquiries into politically motivated crimes are far from complete.
Finally, despite some fits and starts, reparations are yet to be paid
in full to all parties.
The government's efforts to end impunity, a crucial part of 822, are
a key barometer of its commitment to the rule of law. Unfortunately,
in some important respects, the government seems to be losing ground
in the fight against impunity.
Consider the case of Amiot "Cubain" Metayer. The government
incarcerated Metayer in July, but not on charges related to the Dec.
17 violence. Even then, he escaped from prison in early August, along
with some 150 other criminals (including some serving life sentences
for participation in past political killings).
The government obviously failed to take adequate measures to prevent
the escape of this dangerous prisoner. Police forces were outgunned
when local thugs executed a well-coordinated attack on the prison and
other municipal facilities.
The government has not taken any steps to re-arrest Metayer in order
to continue the case against him, although we understand that some efforts
have been made to apprehend some other escapees.
Consider also the case of Brignol Lindor, the journalist murdered in
December 2001. The recent indictment of 10 suspects in the Brignol Lindor
case was a positive development. But conspicuously absent from the list
of suspects was a Fanmi Lavalas official in Petit-Goave whose statements
incited violence against Lindor. We have seen reports in the Haitian
media that the investigating judge might release some suspects. If true,
this will only delay a just resolution of the case.
Some two years after the murder of Jean Dominique, there has been little
movement in his case. Some witnesses were interviewed, but the government
allowed the investigating judge's mandate to lapse and waited several
months before appointing a new one.
The Haitian government's Preliminary Report to the OAS on the events
of Dec. 17 describes actions taken by the government in some of these
cases. We acknowledge that there has indeed been some action taken.
But I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of getting results
and justice. It simply is not enough to reiterate steps that were taken
in the past, particularly since some of that progress has been reversed.
The government must make tangible efforts in all these matters. Only
then will we be able to say that there have been some steps toward establishing
the rule of law.
We also acknowledge the positive steps the government has taken toward
payment of reparations. The Justice Ministry met with lawyers for victims
this past summer and established a framework for making claims.
In mid-September, the Haitian government began the payment process,
but - inexplicably - imposed new technical requirements (producing formal
titles to property), reopened the issue of how much was due to claimants,
and proposed to pick and choose when to pay some victims. We understand
that some claims have been paid in part to some opposition parties,
while talks with others are dragging on.
The delay in settling claims has caused confusion and undermined confidence
in the government's intention to pay full reparations. The government
should make every effort to reach agreement with the opposition and
make full payment, without new conditions or requirements. This is not
just compensation owed to victims; it is an unfulfilled commitment to
the international community.
It is absolutely essential that the Haitian government heal the wounds
caused by Dec. 17. If it does not, then participation of the opposition
in the formation of the CEP becomes problematic, as do prospects for
free and fair elections next year. We urge the government to clear remaining
obstacles and pay the outstanding reparations.
In another important area, the United States is deeply dissatisfied
with counter-narcotics cooperation in Haiti, and very concerned about
police involvement in trafficking.
Operation Hurricane II, a recent joint Haitian-U.S. effort conducted
in northern Haiti, was a disappointment and a setback - only one arrest
and a minor amount of drugs seized. Information on who was to be arrested
and which houses were to be searched leaked from the police. Also, elected
officials in the North actively worked against the operation.
We now estimate that as much as 15 per cent of the cocaine entering
the United States transits through Haiti. Haiti is growing as a cocaine
transshipment point, not shrinking.
Our current cooperation with Haiti is carefully circumscribed because,
on the whole, we do not have confidence in the Haitian National Police.
There are too many senior officers who are either actively involved
in trafficking, and others who turn a blind eye.
We need a housecleaning in the police force before we can engage the
government in systematic counter-narcotics cooperation. Our Embassy
in Port-au-Prince has asked the Aristide government more than once to
remove officers involved in the drug trade. Thus far, some officers
have been removed. We know who the other officers are, the Haitian government
knows, and they too have to go.
When ordinary Haitians cast ballots in 2003, nothing will be more important
than freedom from intimidation and from politically motivated violence.
This will be the key factor in securing broad participation in the elections.
Given the prevalence of well-armed bands of "chimeres" (thugs)
operating at the beck and call of politically connected popular organizations
(OPs), providing a secure environment will not be an easy task. But
it is a task that the government, with the support of the OAS Special
Mission and the international community, must undertake. And this undertaking
must be successful for there to be free and fair elections in 2003.
President Aristide and other senior Haitian officials must take more
forceful public positions calling on popular organizations to reject
violence, and on police to stop using excessive force against legitimate
Inescapably, the Haitian National Police must serve as the principal
means of guaranteeing security for the elections. A poorly trained,
understaffed, and corrupt police force will not be up to the job.
The current crop of some 870 cadets now training at the Police Academy
offers the prospect of additional manpower for election security. The
United States and the international community are willing to provide
technical assistance to the police so it can play a proper role, under
the supervision of a credible and neutral CEP, in providing security
for elections in 2003.
Broader assistance for the HNP, aimed at creating a more professional
and independent force, will depend on the Aristide government's political
will in rooting out corruption and preventing politicization by respecting
internal rules of the HNP regarding recruitment, promotions, and assignments.
Another crucial element for security -- perhaps the most difficult of
all - is disarmament. Progress on an effective plan is essential. The
OAS Special Mission is prepared to work with the government on a priority
basis to create and implement a plan, but no plan will work without
firm Haitian government commitment.
The government must be willing to make difficult and unpopular decisions
-- calling on local officials, especially mayors, and so-called popular
organizations to lay down arms and refrain from their use. More importantly,
it must enforce the disarmament plan once it is formulated.
With respect to disarmament, we understand that on October 10, five
of the nine civil society organizations who are to designate members
for the CEP wrote President Aristide asking that he formally request
the international community for assistance on a disarmament plans and
a security plan for the elections. We understand that to date there
has been no response.
Of course, no one expects disarmament to occur quickly, but an effective
campaign stands little chance of success without sustained Haitian effort,
which we urge the government to make with the support of the international
Let me turn now to another important aspect of our relations with Haiti
- economic relations and humanitarian assistance.
The United States is the largest single-country donor to Haiti, and
has been for many years. We have given over $120 million worth of assistance
to Haiti in the last two years, and close to $1 billion since President
Aristide was restored in 1994.
Our assistance is given primarily through internationally respected
non-\ governmental organizations that work with local counterparts to
ensure that our assistance goes to those in greatest need. Our programs
fund maternal and child health care, HIV/AIDS prevention, reproductive
health, primary school education, agricultural development, food assistance,
and democracy programs, among others.
This might surprise you. It is popular in some circles to talk of a
so-called "embargo" on assistance to Haiti, and to blame many
if not all of Haiti's ills on that so-called embargo.
Let's correct the record:
From the time of the failed legislative elections in May 2000 until
the September 4 approval of OAS Resolution 822, there was a consensus
among major donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs),
that granting of new IFI loans should be deferred until the Government
and the umbrella opposition group, the Convergence Democratique, came
to agreement on terms to resolve the dispute as to who should be sitting
in the Senate.
The Organization of American States took a lead role in mediating this
dispute and on several occasions in 2001 and 2002 came very close to
resolving it. There is little doubt that the incentive of renewed IFI
financing was key in bringing the two sides together, and indeed, that
same incentive was key to the negotiation of Resolution 822.
The use of conditionality relating to basic governance is common in
After Resolution 822, any conditions applied to future loans for Haiti
will involve only those that we would look for in loans to any other
country - solid macroeconomic policies, fiscal responsibility, transparency
of governance, etc.
In sum, despite the hiatus in new IFI lending, Haiti has continued to
receive substantial aid from the United States and others. Haiti continues
to benefit from huge remittances, estimated to exceed $700 million per
year from the UNITED STATES, from its diaspora-over half a million persons
of Haitian origin are U.S. residents. It continues to benefit from emigration
to the United States -- some 45,000 Haitians have emigrated, legally,
to this country in the last three years to start new lives here, adding
each year to the remittance stream.
So, in closing, let me say again that the government's efforts to comply
with resolutions 806 and 822 are disappointing. It is discouraging that
the Aristide government is not doing more to live up to its obligations.
On virtually all fronts - from a timely accounting of its actions taken
with respect to December 17, to effective steps to end impunity, to
disarmament, to reparations, to counter-narcotics, to election security
- the government has simply not moved with enough commitment or effectiveness.
The government of Haiti must do more to comply with the OAS resolutions
and its commitments to its own people. Absent that, Haiti faces a future
that is at risk.
Let me end in the same manner I began, by expressing our concern about
We are concerned about the well-being of the Haitian people; we are
concerned about the effectiveness and legitimacy of institutions that
still bear the stigma of the flawed elections of 2000, and we are concerned
about the reluctance so far of the Aristide administration to meet the
commitments it has made to the OAS, its member states, and to the Haitian
The primary responsibility for addressing Haiti's political and economic
problems rests with the government of Haiti.
Now is the time for that government to live up to its commitments to
fulfill the great promise of this creative and vibrant people, who have
as much to claim to democracy and economic opportunity as any of us.
Released on October 30, 2002