OAS Resolution 822

OAS Resolutions
1831, 806, 822... et al


Roger Noreiga on OAS Resolution 822 and 806, October 30, 2002

Dessalines Is Rising!!
Ayisyen: You Are Not Alone!


U.S. Patterns in Haiti

Jean Jacques Dessalines


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zilibuttonCarnegie Hall
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No other national
group in the world
sends more money
than Haitians living
in the Diaspora
Red Sea- audio

The Red Sea

Ezili Dantò's master Haitian dance class (Video clip)

zilibuttonEzili's Dantò's
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So Much Like Here- Jazzoetry CD audio clip

Ezili Danto's

to Self

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Angry with
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A group of Haitian migrants arrive in a bus after being repatriated from the nearby Turks and Caicos Islands, in Cap-Haitien, northern Haiti, Thursday, May 10, 2007. They were part of the survivors of a sailing vessel crowded with Haitian migrants that overturned Friday, May 4 in moonlit waters a half-mile from shore in shark-infested waters. Haitian migrants claim a Turks and Caicos naval vessel rammed their crowded sailboat twice before it capsized. (AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos)

Dessalines' Law
and Ideals

Breaking Sea Chains

Little Girl
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Anba Dlo, Nan Ginen
Ezili Danto's Art-With-The-Ancestors Workshops - See, Red, Black & Moonlight series or Haitian-West African

Clip one -Clip two
ance performance
zilibutton In a series of articles written for the October 17, 2006 bicentennial commemoration of the life and works of Dessalines, I wrote for HLLN that: "Haiti's liberator and founding father, General Jean Jacques Dessalines, said, "I Want the Assets of the Country to be Equitably Divided" and for that he was assassinated by the Mullato sons of France. That was the first coup d'etat, the Haitian holocaust - organized exclusion of the masses, misery, poverty and the impunity of the economic elite - continues (with Feb. 29, 2004 marking the 33rd coup d'etat). Haiti's peoples continue to resist the return of despots, tyrants and enslavers who wage war on the poor majority and Black, contain-them-in poverty through neocolonialism' debts, "free trade" and foreign "investments." These neocolonial tyrants refuse to allow an equitable division of wealth, excluding the majority in Haiti from sharing in the country's wealth and assets." (See also, Kanga Mundele: Our mission to live free or die trying, Another Haitian Independence Day under occupation; The Legacy of Impunity of One Sector-Who killed Dessalines?; The Legacy of Impunity:The Neoconlonialist inciting political instability is the problem. Haiti is underdeveloped in crime, corruption, violence, compared to other nations, all, by Marguerite 'Ezili Dantò' Laurent
No other national group in the world sends more money than Haitians living in the Diaspora


...Res. 822 also "instruct[s] the Secretary General to strengthen further the Special OAS Mission to Haiti in order for it to support, monitor, and report on implementation of this and all other pertinent OAS resolutions and on commitments of the Government of Haiti."

"This is a commission of guardianship," observed Ben Dupuy, secretary general of the National Popular Party (PPN), which has called on Haiti’s progressive forces to join with it in forming an alternative to the Convergence and the Aristide’s Lavalas Family party (FL). "Students of history will remember that before Napoleon sent 40,000 troops [to try to reimpose slavery in the French colony of St. Domingue in 1801], he sent a series of commissions, whose role was to create division, and ready things for what was to come... That’s the same role the Special OAS Mission to Haiti plays today: preparing the ground for another intervention, another occupation of the country..." (Excerpted from
"OAS Resolution Augurs Return of Foreign Troops Not Aid", Haiti Progres, Sept. 11, 2002.)

Media Lies and Real Haiti News

"...The most disingenuous claim used repeatedly by the opposition and the U.S. was that the “security situation” was not sufficient to maintain a fair election. Long before the destabilizing efforts of Guy Philippe and Louis Jodel Chamblain, the U.S. claimed the security situation was not adequate for an election. However, Haiti did not have a recent history of violence in its elections, and the United States long advocated elections to diminish conflict in such countries as El Salvador or Guatemala even in the midst of their civil wars. At the same time, the U.S. continued its financial and arms embargo thereby making it impossible for the Haitian government, with virtually no resources, to further strengthen the police.

The desire to disrupt the country through economic destabilization however was not completely successful in the short run. Haitians were upset but they still supported democracy and knew that if Aristide was thrown out it meant the end of democracy in the country. The “opposition” recognizing they could not beat Aristide at the polls eventually developed a “street” strategy of confrontation..."
("The February 29th Coup d’Etat Against President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the Role of the United States in the Coup (Second of two articles)", Haiti Progres, March 24, 2004

OAS Resolutions

In June 2003, the OAS General Assembly resolved

"... to urge all parties to take part in the formation of a credible, neutral and independent Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) when a climate of security conducive to free, fair and transparent elections has been created." ( See, OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 1959 (XXXIII-O/03) of June 10, 2003: Support for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti and Amnesty International's "Haiti Abuse of human rights: political violence as the 200th anniversary of independence approaches.")

But when, from February 29, 2004 to May 2006, after the foreign ouster of Haiti's democratically elected government anarchy reigned supreme in Haiti, and the U.S. and its U.N. and OAS surrogates wished to solidify their bicentennial coup detat gains with (s)elections, there was scant OAS concerned the 2006-elections-under-occupation should be free, fair and transparent.

That is, even though most of the leaders of Haiti's most popular political party where in prison, in exile, indefinitely incarcerated as political prisoners or being hunted down by coup d'etat death squads and the restructed-by-foreigners-Haitian-police.

The OAS, in fact, cheered on the exclusion of Haiti's masses from the elections by giving contracts (printing and for digital voting machines) for the elections to the Haitian coup detat implementers - the Boulos and Apaid families. No OAS 822-like resolution expressed concerned that "all parties take part in the formation a credible, neutral and independent Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)."

Indeed, the OAS, UN and US made sure that the CEP was stacked with coup d'etat sympathizers and orchestrators and headed by an illegal executive director, Jacques Bernard. Fraudulent and illegitimate was imposed on Haitians, first through the impositions of the Latortue Boca Raton Regime and then through rendering President Rene Preval a puppet with the Haitian Supreme Court, police, legislature, his cabinet and foreign ministries stacked with coup d'etat collaborators while 9,000 foreign troops aimed their guns at Haiti's head should these collaborators be fired and denounced by the elected President and Haitian majority. (See, "Who Benefits from the disappearance of Lovinsky Pierre Antoine." )

That was "the climate of security" this white world had been planning for fourteen years. They had destabilized Haiti's duly elected governments through countless diplomatic tools like OAS resolutions, through a humanitarian embargo, media disinformation and propaganda, by financing anti-democratic opponents with no significant popular support and other such morally reprehensible tactics.

It was shown in several Haiti Progres articles, that:

"...Each time the opposition made an excuse, no matter how patently absurd, the U.S. government agreed with them and put more pressure on Aristide and his government. The international community, led by the U.S. and the OAS as their surrogate, for example, required the Haitian government to pay millions of dollars in restitution to opposition parties arising out of the attempted December 17th (2001) coup (during which opposition commandos briefly took over the National Palace) ...The opposition was never pressured to take any steps required under the OAS resolution..."
(822 passed by OAS General Assembly, September, 2002) - excerpted from "The February 29th Coup d’Etat Against President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the Role of the United States in the Coup (Second of two articles)", Haiti Progres, March 24, 2004


"...Also, echoing last January’s Res. 806, Res. 822 demands that the Haitian government disarm its partisans with "the active cooperation of the International Community" and undertake the "effective prosecution of any person, and dismissal, when appropriate, of any person found to be author of or accomplice in the violence of Dec. 17, 2001, and subsequent days." On that date, government partisans burned and looted opposition leaders’ homes and headquarters following an unsuccessful attempted assassination of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by a 30-man armed commando unit (see Haïti Progrès, Vol. 19, No. 40, 1/19/2001).

The penniless Haitian government is also commanded to undertake "prompt reparation for organizations and individuals who suffered damages as a direct result of the violence."
(OAS Resolution Augurs Return of Foreign Troops Not Aid, Haiti Progres, Sept. 11, 2002
http://www.haitiprogres.com/2002/sm020911/eng09-11.html )

"...Furthermore, last week, David Lee, the Canadian OAS special representative to Haiti, scolded the Haitian government that there "is still much to do" in implementing Res. 822, in particular the round-up and disarmament of government supporters who ransacked opposition homes and headquarters on Dec. 17, 2001, following an assassination attempt on President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Lee called the pursuit of Dec. 17 rioters outlined last month in a Haitian Justice Ministry preliminary report"fictitious" and reminded the government that its treasury-emptying compensation of opposition leaders with millions of gourdes "is not yet completed." (Faced with U.S. Arrogance, New Popular Movement Grows, Haiti Progres, Oct. 16, 2002)

"...Res. 822, passed on Sep. 4, represents just one more loop in the noose being tightened around Haiti’s neck.

It is the latest in a series of OAS resolutions over the past two years maneuvering the Inter-American Democratic Charter into place to be invoked against Haiti, if necessary. The Democratic Charter is a hemispheric accord, approved one year ago, which empowers the OAS to take action against any member state which deviates from Washington’s definition of democracy (see Haïti Progrès, Vol. 19, No. 44, 1/16/2002)




OAS Resolution 822


Original version: French

Whereas FIPA is aware of the extreme gravity of the economic and political situation in Haiti;

Whereas OAS Resolution 822 contains the essential elements for resolving the
crisis in Haiti;

Be it resolved that: the Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas, through its
Executive Committee,

1. Supports intensification of the negotiations between international financial
organizations and the Haitian government with the support of all parties
concerned, without prior political conditions regarding the holding of an
election pursuant to OAS Resolution 822 (1331/02);

2. Supports the holding of democratic elections and encourages the
provision of technical assistance by the international community;

3. Strongly encourages all parties concerned to participate actively in
implementing Resolution 822 so that democratic elections can be held in
2003, and makes a commitment to support the efforts of all parties
concerned to achieve this goal as soon as possible.



by the continuing political crisis in Haiti resulting from the elections of May 21, 2000;

HAVING CONSIDERED the extensive efforts by the OAS and CARICOM to
contribute to resolution of that crisis and the numerous missions that these two
organizations have dispatched to Haiti to facilitate agreement on a political
accord, without having reached a satisfactory solution;

HAVING SEEN the Sixth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American
States to Haiti on the OAS-CARICOM mission to Haiti from July 5 to 10, 2002
(CP/doc. 3625/02 corr. 3), headed by the Assistant Secretary General,
Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saint Lucia, the
Honorable Julian Hunte, in his capacity as CARICOM representative, and the
Report of the Secretary General In Response to CP/INF. 4724/02
(CP/doc.3643/02 corr. 1);

HAVING NOTED in those documents the respective positions of the Government
of Haiti and Convergence Democratique with regard to the Draft Initial Accord
submitted by the OAS and CARICOM negotiators on June 12, 2002;

that Fanmi Lavalas and Convergence Democratique have
agreed on the need for elections in 2003 and on the formation of the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP), as well as on its composition and on arrangements for
appointment of its members, as set forth in the OAS Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9)
of June 12, 2002;

RECALLING resolutions CP/RES. 772 (1247/02) of August 4, 2000; CP/RES.
786 (1267/01) corr. 2, of March 19, 2001; AG/RES. 1831 (XXXI-O/01) of June 5,
2001; CP/RES. 806 (1303/02), corr. 1, of January 15, 2002; and AG/RES. 1841
(XXXII-O/02), of June 4, 2002;

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the steps the Government of Haiti has taken to
comply with these resolutions, as stated in the Report of the Secretary General In Response to CP/INF. 4724/02 (CP/doc.3643/02 corr. 1);

That the Special Mission of the Organization of American States to Strengthen
Democracy in Haiti has been deployed and is pursuing its activities in
accordance with resolution CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) corr. 1;

That the independent Commission of Inquiry has submitted its report on the
events of December 17, 2001, and that the Government of Haiti has committed
to implement the recommendations made in this report;

That on July 10, 2002, the Government of Haiti and the victims of the events of
December 17, 2001, signed a protocol of agreement on the payment of
reparations and that the Government of Haiti has committed itself to make
payment to each victim based on procedures established by the OAS Advisory
Council on Reparations;

That the Government of Haiti has proposed that free, fair and technically feasible legislative and local elections be held in the first half of 2003;

Of the need to normalize the functioning of democratic institutions in Haiti and to strengthen them, in keeping with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and that for this purpose the OAS will continue to use its good offices and resources;

That preparations must begin soon for free, fair and technically feasible
legislative and local elections in 2003;

That dialogue and consensus-building measures are necessary to help
guarantee a peaceful and democratic solution to the political crisis in Haiti;

That the Inter-American Democratic Charter proclaims that "the peoples of the
Americas have a right to democracy and that their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it;" and that "essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with
the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret
balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the
separation of powers and independence of the branches of government";

That the Inter-American Democratic Charter also states that "democracy and
social and economic development are interdependent and are mutually
reinforcing" and that the "promotion and observance of economic, social, and
cultural rights are inherently linked to integral development, equitable economic
growth, and to the consolidation of democracy in the states of the Hemisphere";


by the continuing deterioration of the socioeconomic
situation in Haiti, the ongoing suffering of the people, and its potential for
humanitarian disaster and convinced that efforts must be made, as a matter of
urgency, to alleviate these conditions;


1.To take note of the Sixth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti (CP/doc. 3625/02 corr. 3) concerning the joint OAS/CARICOM efforts to facilitate a solution to the political crisis in Haiti, and to thank the OAS Secretary General, the Assistant Secretary General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saint Lucia in his capacity as Representative of
CARICOM for their initiatives in this regard.

2. To take note of the report of the Commission of Inquiry and to thank the Commission and the Advisory Council on Reparations for their diligent efforts in
contributing to a peaceful resolution of the political crisis in Haiti.

3. To welcome the Government of Haiti's expressed commitment to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry as well as the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Reparations, as reflected in the Accord signed by the Minister of Justice, Claimants and their Representatives on July 9, 2002, and to call on the Government of Haiti to do so as soon as possible.

4. To further welcome the Government of Haiti's pledge to undertake additional
confidence building measures, bearing in mind that some elements can be implemented more expeditiously than others and that additional financial and technical assistance may be necessary. These measures include:

a. To publish within 60 days of receipt of the Commission of Inquiry Report a report by the Minister of Justice on actions taken with respect to persons found to be implicated in the events of December 17, 2001 and subsequent days;

b. To strengthen its disarmament policies and programs and, in this regard, invite the active cooperation of the International Community, through the OAS Special Mission, in the development and implementation of a comprehensive disarmament program;

c. To implement, to the fullest extent of its lawful authority, all the Recommendations on Human Rights and the Press set forth in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of December 17, 2001, and all other Recommendations in the Report that are, in whole or in part, directed to it.

5. To recognize, as noted in the report of the Secretary General of August 20,
2002 (CP/doc. 3643/02 corr. 1), the positive steps that the Government of Haiti has taken to date to implement Permanent Council resolution CP/RES. 806
(1303/02) corr. 1 and to support and urge it to implement fully all pending
elements of that resolution as soon as possible, bearing in mind that some
elements can be implemented more expeditiously than others and that additional financial and technical assistance may be necessary.

These include in particular:

a. The restoration of a climate of security;

b. The effective prosecution of any person, and dismissal, when appropriate, of any person found to be author of or accomplice in the violence of December 17, 2001, and subsequent days;

c. The completion of a thorough inquiry into all politically-motivated crimes;

d. Prompt reparation for organizations and individuals who suffered damages as a direct result of the violence of December 17, 2001.

6. To urge the Government of Haiti that, with a view to establishing the
conditions for elections to be held in 2003, it renew efforts to ensure a climate of security and confidence within the parameters established in operative paragraph

5 of AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02), bearing in mind the need to strengthen
independent police and judicial institutions as part of its renewed efforts to
combat impunity as called for in paragraph 6 of AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02).

7. To reaffirm the importance of holding free, fair, and technically feasible
legislative and local elections-on a date in 2003 to be established by the
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)--in which all political parties can participate
freely and securely. The conduct of these elections shall take into consideration the Government of Haiti's constitutional electoral prerogatives and shall be in accordance with the process proposed by the OAS in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9) of June 12, 2002, which includes:

a. The formation of an autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP) no later than two months after adoption of this resolution;

b. The establishment by the CEP, within the parameters of Haitian law and no later than 30 days after the formation of the CEP, of a Electoral Guarantees Commission (CGE), which shall be comprised of, inter alia, representatives of a national coordination body formed on the basis of experience of coordinating electoral observation in Haiti and of civil society organizations, and witnessed by representatives of electoral observation missions and the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti ;

c. The monitoring by the CEP of the activities of the police in connection with the electoral process.

8. To further recognize the urgency of forming the CEP, in accordance with the
process proposed by the OAS in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9) of June 12,
2002, no later than two months after adoption of this resolution.

9. To offer the Government of Haiti, political parties, and civil society the support and technical assistance of the Organization of American States that is required to facilitate the process of forming the CEP and preparing for and holding these elections.

10. To encourage all Haitian parties to participate in all relevant aspects of those elections and in the electoral process leading up to it.

11. To support normalization of economic cooperation between the
Government of Haiti and the international financial institutions and urge those
parties to resolve the technical and financial obstacles that preclude such

12. To reaffirm the mandates of the Secretary General and the OAS Special
Mission in accordance with AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02), AG/RES. 1831 (XXXI-
O/01), and CP/RES. 806 (1303/02 corr. 1) and to instruct the Secretary General to strengthen further the Special OAS Mission to Haiti in order for it to support, monitor, and report on implementation of this and all other pertinent OAS resolutions and on commitments of the Government of Haiti, as set forth in these resolutions and in accordance with the agreement between the Government of Haiti and the OAS on the Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti.

These commitments include:

a. Strengthening of democratic institutions, including political parties, in order to guarantee a pluralistic political party system;

b. Formation of a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), in accordance with the process proposed by the OAS in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9) of June 12, 2002, and all of the CEP's activities;

c. Establishment by the CEP of an Electoral Guarantees Commission (CGE);

d. Development and implementation of a comprehensive disarmament program;

e. Promotion of a National Dialogue and Consensus Building between the Government of Haiti, all political parties, and Haitian civil society;

f. Professional development of an independent police institution, development of a security plan and creation of a climate of security for the 2003 elections;

13. The OAS Special Mission will also:
a. Support, monitor, and report on provision by the international community and the OAS of technical electoral assistance prior to and following the 2003 elections and on deployment of an electoral observation mission to observe all aspects of the electoral process;

b. Coordinate efforts of the international community to provide technical and financial electoral assistance, including electoral planning, technical assistance, security, and observation of the elections in 2003.

14. To call on the Secretary General to remain engaged in efforts to resolve
the political crisis in Haiti, to follow the evolution of the situation, and to submit to the Permanent Council every two months detailed reports regarding the implementation of the present resolution.

15. To call on the international community to provide as a matter of urgency
additional funds to the OAS Special Mission in order to help finance its economic, social and institutional strengthening programs for Haiti, with a view to discharging its additional responsibilities under this resolution.

16. To further call on the international community to provide technical and financial support for the elections in 2003, particularly by observing the pre-
electoral formation and operation of the CEP and post-electoral operations, as
well as the elections themselves.



It's Neither Hope nor Progress when the International Community is Running Haiti


Media Lies and Real Haiti News


Remarks on Haiti,
Source: U.
S. State Department, October 30, 2002

Ambassador Roger F. Noriega, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS

Presentation to the Inter-American Dialogue

Washington, DC
October 30, 2002

Thank you for your kind introduction. I welcome the opportunity to address the distinguished members and guests of the Inter-American Dialogue today. Since its formation in the early 1980s, this organization has done much to bring understanding to important problems facing the Western Hemisphere. It has helped to shape the agenda of issues and policy choices on inter-American relations.

Today I want to share with you some thoughts on Haiti.

Of course, the United States is concerned about what is happening in Haiti. As Americans, we appreciate Haiti's vibrant culture and the resiliency of its people. We feel a historic kinship that arises from our shared struggles for independence and, more practically, from the hundreds of thousands of Haitians now living and working in the United States.

And yet - despite all the resources the international community, including the United States, has devoted to assist the Haitian people - extraordinary problems persist.

This has not deterred our government from continuing to help the Haitian people, nor should it deter the international community from doing so. However, it does mean that we must speak openly about what these problems are and state frankly our views about how Haiti can best solve them.

And a candid, open discussion requires me to say that we have very serious concerns about the leadership of Jean Bertrand Aristide.

Let us start by looking at Haitian government efforts to comply with OAS Resolutions 806 and 822.
(emphasis added by HLLN)

The record of Haitian government compliance with these resolutions thus far is frankly discouraging.

Resolution 806 was adopted January 16, 2002 by the OAS in direct response to the violent events of July 28 and December 17, 2001.

On July 28, 2001, simultaneous attacks on the National Police Academy and police stations in different parts of the country resulted in several deaths, including a number of police officers.

On December 17, the National Palace was attacked and part of it briefly occupied by the attackers. Also that day, in a series of coordinated incidents in Port-au-Prince and other cities, attackers ransacked and burned the offices of opposition political parties, and damaged or destroyed the residences of some members of the opposition.

These violent incidents last July and December substantially impeded efforts, led by the OAS, to broker an accord between Fanmi Lavalas and the opposition settling the dispute that followed the elections in May 2000. Resolution 806 called on the Haitian government to diligently pursue all efforts to restore a climate of security. In particular, Resolution 806 among other things required:

-- completion of a thorough, independent inquiry into the events related to
Dec. 17;

-- prosecution of any person and dismissal, where appropriate, of any government official found to be complicit in the Dec. 17 violence;

-- completion of a thorough inquiry into all politically-motivated crimes; and

-- reparations for organizations and individuals who suffered damages as a direct result of the violence of Dec. 17.

The OAS subsequently adopted Resolution 822 on September 4, 2002. In doing so, it incorporated by reference the provisions of Res. 806 and specifically reiterated the requirements of that resolution, as I have just described them. In addition, it incorporated new commitments made by the Haitian government, including:

-- publishing a report on actions taken with respect to persons found to be implicated in the events of December 17;

-- strengthening disarmament policies and programs; and

-- implementing to the fullest extent possible recommendations on improving human rights and protecting the press, as made by the OAS Commission of Inquiry Report into the events of December 17.

Resolution 822 also called on the Haitian Government to ensure a climate of security and confidence with a view to establishing the conditions necessary for free and fair elections in 2003. It established November 4 as the date by which autonomous, credible, and neutral Provisional Electoral Council should be formed.

The United States gave its full support to OAS Resolution 822. Indeed, along with Canada, CARICOM, and others, we were instrumental in facilitating negotiations that produced unanimous adoption of 822 at the OAS.

Full Haitian government compliance with Resolutions 806 and 822 is essential.

November 4 is coming up fast. That is the date projected under Resolution 822 for formation of the Provisional Electoral Council. All concerned parties - the opposition, the international community, NGOs, and most importantly the Haitian people - are looking to the Haitian government for concrete progress as that date approaches.

Unfortunately, the Haitian government has not met its commitments.

The OAS did conduct an independent inquiry into the events of Dec. 17, and - yes - the Haitian government did cooperate in that effort. However, the government has yet to produce its own final report on Dec. 17 as required by Resolution 822 and has yet to initiate any prosecutions. Moreover, inquiries into politically motivated crimes are far from complete.

Finally, despite some fits and starts, reparations are yet to be paid in full to all parties.

The government's efforts to end impunity, a crucial part of 822, are a key barometer of its commitment to the rule of law. Unfortunately, in some important respects, the government seems to be losing ground in the fight against impunity.

Consider the case of Amiot "Cubain" Metayer. The government incarcerated Metayer in July, but not on charges related to the Dec. 17 violence. Even then, he escaped from prison in early August, along with some 150 other criminals (including some serving life sentences for participation in past political killings).

The government obviously failed to take adequate measures to prevent the escape of this dangerous prisoner. Police forces were outgunned when local thugs executed a well-coordinated attack on the prison and other municipal facilities.

The government has not taken any steps to re-arrest Metayer in order to continue the case against him, although we understand that some efforts have been made to apprehend some other escapees.

Consider also the case of Brignol Lindor, the journalist murdered in December 2001. The recent indictment of 10 suspects in the Brignol Lindor case was a positive development. But conspicuously absent from the list of suspects was a Fanmi Lavalas official in Petit-Goave whose statements incited violence against Lindor. We have seen reports in the Haitian media that the investigating judge might release some suspects. If true, this will only delay a just resolution of the case.

Some two years after the murder of Jean Dominique, there has been little movement in his case. Some witnesses were interviewed, but the government allowed the investigating judge's mandate to lapse and waited several months before appointing a new one.

The Haitian government's Preliminary Report to the OAS on the events of Dec. 17 describes actions taken by the government in some of these cases. We acknowledge that there has indeed been some action taken. But I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of getting results and justice. It simply is not enough to reiterate steps that were taken in the past, particularly since some of that progress has been reversed.

The government must make tangible efforts in all these matters. Only then will we be able to say that there have been some steps toward establishing the rule of law.

We also acknowledge the positive steps the government has taken toward payment of reparations. The Justice Ministry met with lawyers for victims this past summer and established a framework for making claims.

In mid-September, the Haitian government began the payment process, but - inexplicably - imposed new technical requirements (producing formal titles to property), reopened the issue of how much was due to claimants, and proposed to pick and choose when to pay some victims. We understand that some claims have been paid in part to some opposition parties, while talks with others are dragging on.

The delay in settling claims has caused confusion and undermined confidence in the government's intention to pay full reparations. The government should make every effort to reach agreement with the opposition and make full payment, without new conditions or requirements. This is not just compensation owed to victims; it is an unfulfilled commitment to the international community.

It is absolutely essential that the Haitian government heal the wounds caused by Dec. 17. If it does not, then participation of the opposition in the formation of the CEP becomes problematic, as do prospects for free and fair elections next year. We urge the government to clear remaining obstacles and pay the outstanding reparations.

In another important area, the United States is deeply dissatisfied with counter-narcotics cooperation in Haiti, and very concerned about police involvement in trafficking.

Operation Hurricane II, a recent joint Haitian-U.S. effort conducted in northern Haiti, was a disappointment and a setback - only one arrest and a minor amount of drugs seized. Information on who was to be arrested and which houses were to be searched leaked from the police. Also, elected officials in the North actively worked against the operation.

We now estimate that as much as 15 per cent of the cocaine entering the United States transits through Haiti. Haiti is growing as a cocaine transshipment point, not shrinking.

Our current cooperation with Haiti is carefully circumscribed because, on the whole, we do not have confidence in the Haitian National Police. There are too many senior officers who are either actively involved in trafficking, and others who turn a blind eye.

We need a housecleaning in the police force before we can engage the government in systematic counter-narcotics cooperation. Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince has asked the Aristide government more than once to remove officers involved in the drug trade. Thus far, some officers have been removed. We know who the other officers are, the Haitian government knows, and they too have to go.

When ordinary Haitians cast ballots in 2003, nothing will be more important than freedom from intimidation and from politically motivated violence. This will be the key factor in securing broad participation in the elections.

Given the prevalence of well-armed bands of "chimeres" (thugs) operating at the beck and call of politically connected popular organizations (OPs), providing a secure environment will not be an easy task. But it is a task that the government, with the support of the OAS Special Mission and the international community, must undertake. And this undertaking must be successful for there to be free and fair elections in 2003.

President Aristide and other senior Haitian officials must take more forceful public positions calling on popular organizations to reject violence, and on police to stop using excessive force against legitimate demonstrations.

Inescapably, the Haitian National Police must serve as the principal means of guaranteeing security for the elections. A poorly trained, understaffed, and corrupt police force will not be up to the job.

The current crop of some 870 cadets now training at the Police Academy offers the prospect of additional manpower for election security. The United States and the international community are willing to provide technical assistance to the police so it can play a proper role, under the supervision of a credible and neutral CEP, in providing security for elections in 2003.

Broader assistance for the HNP, aimed at creating a more professional and independent force, will depend on the Aristide government's political will in rooting out corruption and preventing politicization by respecting internal rules of the HNP regarding recruitment, promotions, and assignments.

Another crucial element for security -- perhaps the most difficult of all - is disarmament. Progress on an effective plan is essential. The OAS Special Mission is prepared to work with the government on a priority basis to create and implement a plan, but no plan will work without firm Haitian government commitment.

The government must be willing to make difficult and unpopular decisions -- calling on local officials, especially mayors, and so-called popular organizations to lay down arms and refrain from their use. More importantly, it must enforce the disarmament plan once it is formulated.

With respect to disarmament, we understand that on October 10, five of the nine civil society organizations who are to designate members for the CEP wrote President Aristide asking that he formally request the international community for assistance on a disarmament plans and a security plan for the elections. We understand that to date there has been no response.

Of course, no one expects disarmament to occur quickly, but an effective campaign stands little chance of success without sustained Haitian effort, which we urge the government to make with the support of the international community.

Let me turn now to another important aspect of our relations with Haiti - economic relations and humanitarian assistance.

The United States is the largest single-country donor to Haiti, and has been for many years. We have given over $120 million worth of assistance to Haiti in the last two years, and close to $1 billion since President Aristide was restored in 1994.

Our assistance is given primarily through internationally respected non-\ governmental organizations that work with local counterparts to ensure that our assistance goes to those in greatest need. Our programs fund maternal and child health care, HIV/AIDS prevention, reproductive health, primary school education, agricultural development, food assistance, and democracy programs, among others.

This might surprise you. It is popular in some circles to talk of a so-called "embargo" on assistance to Haiti, and to blame many if not all of Haiti's ills on that so-called embargo.

Let's correct the record:

From the time of the failed legislative elections in May 2000 until the September 4 approval of OAS Resolution 822, there was a consensus among major donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs), that granting of new IFI loans should be deferred until the Government and the umbrella opposition group, the Convergence Democratique, came to agreement on terms to resolve the dispute as to who should be sitting in the Senate.

The Organization of American States took a lead role in mediating this dispute and on several occasions in 2001 and 2002 came very close to resolving it. There is little doubt that the incentive of renewed IFI financing was key in bringing the two sides together, and indeed, that same incentive was key to the negotiation of Resolution 822.

The use of conditionality relating to basic governance is common in donor finance.

After Resolution 822, any conditions applied to future loans for Haiti will involve only those that we would look for in loans to any other country - solid macroeconomic policies, fiscal responsibility, transparency of governance, etc.

In sum, despite the hiatus in new IFI lending, Haiti has continued to receive substantial aid from the United States and others. Haiti continues to benefit from huge remittances, estimated to exceed $700 million per year from the UNITED STATES, from its diaspora-over half a million persons of Haitian origin are U.S. residents. It continues to benefit from emigration to the United States -- some 45,000 Haitians have emigrated, legally, to this country in the last three years to start new lives here, adding each year to the remittance stream.

So, in closing, let me say again that the government's efforts to comply with resolutions 806 and 822 are disappointing. It is discouraging that the Aristide government is not doing more to live up to its obligations.

On virtually all fronts - from a timely accounting of its actions taken with respect to December 17, to effective steps to end impunity, to disarmament, to reparations, to counter-narcotics, to election security - the government has simply not moved with enough commitment or effectiveness. The government of Haiti must do more to comply with the OAS resolutions and its commitments to its own people. Absent that, Haiti faces a future that is at risk.

Let me end in the same manner I began, by expressing our concern about Haiti.
We are concerned about the well-being of the Haitian people; we are concerned about the effectiveness and legitimacy of institutions that still bear the stigma of the flawed elections of 2000, and we are concerned about the reluctance so far of the Aristide administration to meet the commitments it has made to the OAS, its member states, and to the Haitian people.

The primary responsibility for addressing Haiti's political and economic problems rests with the government of Haiti.

Now is the time for that government to live up to its commitments to fulfill the great promise of this creative and vibrant people, who have as much to claim to democracy and economic opportunity as any of us.

Thank you.

Released on October 30, 2002


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