The International Community's Plans to deny
free and fair elections are revealed
The International Community's intentions for Haiti are revealed.
The Canadian plan for Haiti to be occupied by the international community
in the way that James Foley helped fixed in Kosovo as predicted and
specified by Michel Chossudovsky in an article entitled "The destabilization
of Haiti at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO402D.html ) has now
been crystallized in the Canadian document copied below, written by
FOCAL (Canadian Foundation for the Americas) and entitled: The Role
for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti: Structures, Options and Leadership
Below is the international community's UN Mandate Structure for Haiti.
The point of the Coup d'etat was to reach this idea of a "protectorate."
For, it is clear if free and fair elections were help in Haiti today,
Lavalas, the party that these warmongers unseated would again win. Thus,
free and fair elections, or democracy in Haiti must be avoided at all
cost. With the help of the Chalabis of Haiti, the tiny morally repugnant
Haitian elites, Canada, who has been outsourced the U.S.'s traditional
role in the Western Hemisphere with regard to Haiti due to Mr. Bush's
overextension in Iraq, proposes to hold a conference, where the resolutions
for this "protectorate" among other pronouncement in contravention
of Haiti's sovereignty, shall be rubber stamped by its Haitian proxies.
Again Haitians of the Diaspora state categorically that neither Canada,
France, the UN nor the United States have the legal right, moral or
any competence whatsoever to substitute an elected government in Haiti
with dictatorship or colonial rule. Only free and fair elections in
Haiti shall lead to good governance, stability and security in Haiti.
While all these Internationals are supposedly in Iraq replacing dictatorship
with democracy, the document below from Canada formally notes how the
U.S./France and Canada along with their selected Haitian stooges are
attempting to permanently replace Haiti's democracy with dictatorship.
The integrity and sovereign right of the Haitian people for self-rule
shall not be sold. The only solutions to the overthrow of Haiti's elected
government is 1) its return and for free and fair elections to be held,
2) for the international community to stop turning a blind eye, or worst
participating in the targeted political assassinations of Lavalas supporters
and for there to be a plan for the disarming of the ex-Haitian military
and FRAPH paramilitary. Those are the demands of the Haitian people.
A UN protectorate run by UN officials such as Gerald Latortue is as
unthinkable to Haitians as the Coup d'etat that first brought the UN
occupying troops and its "interim government" to Haiti.
The destabilization campaign which led to this juncture shall not find
ultimate success in the complete occupation of Haiti for ten, twenty
or thirty years ( See FOCAL's racists and facists neo-con musings below
and in the context of Schossudovsky's article at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO402D.html
Marguerite Laurent, Esq.
Haitian Lawyers Leadership Network
December 7, 2004
The author can be reached
The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti:
Structures, Options and Leadership
This paper has been prepared for the House of Commons Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade in response to the Committee’s
request by Carlo Dade, Senior Advisor with FOCAL (Canadian Foundation
for the Americas) and John W. Graham, Chair of FOCAL.
For the third time in 20 years the government in Haiti has collapsed
once again leaving the poorest country in the hemisphere as a destabilizing
influence on its neighbours, a growing narcotics and transnational crime
base and a major source of apprehension to Haitian and Caribbean descendant
populations in Canada. These are sources of concern for Canada both
domestically and regionally.
Past attempts to improve governance and quality of life have largely
failed through a
combination of Haitian truculence, corruption, donor fatigue and impatience.
Continued failure will make reform more difficult as the repercussions
from lawlessness and poverty increasingly impact the region.
The situation in Haiti is dire but not yet at the level of concern as
in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia, though Haiti clearly is heading in
that direction. The challenge is to learn from past mistakes at State
building in Haiti and elsewhere to find a development model that will
work. Without a forceful and committed advocate from the developed world,
discussions at the UN, the OAS, and CARICOM will continue to lack urgency
and focus and Haiti will again slip from the forefront of international
conscience. Canada has a unique combination of national interest and
comparative advantage to work in Haiti.
Given its commitments elsewhere, the United States appears reluctant
take on long-term leadership. Canada remains the only country in the
hemisphere with the appropriate experience and qualifications. This
is an opportunity for Canada to assert the leadership, which the Prime
Minister is seeking, complement multilateral measures that Canada already
has supported and raise Canada's hemispheric profile.
This paper offers a brief analysis, outlines a plan of action and concludes
with discussion of the exit strategy.
2. Background and Legal Authority
In Haiti, institutions that support law and order and exercise the functions
of government have broken down under internal violence and economic
collapse. The remnants of a 2/6 Haitian State persist as a shadow presence;
it retains a flimsy legal standing but, for all practical purposes,
has lost the ability to exercise authority in its own territory. Haiti
has become a 'failed state'. States which lack control over their territory
and which cannot guarantee law and order
threaten international peace by serving as a base for crime, public
health threats, refugee crisis and regional unrest. Such States also
harm the basic human rights of their own citizens. Failed States have
thus become subject to intervention by the international community through
actions most often initiated and carried out by the U.N. Security Council
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Haiti clearly meets the definition of a failed State and U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1529 of February 2004 on Haiti grants authority both
for a peacekeeping intervention (Section 2: "Authorizes the immediate
deployment of a Multinational Interim Force..." and Section 3:
"Declares its readiness to establish a follow-on U.N. stabilization
force...") as well as a longer-term intervention (Section 10. "Calls
upon the international community, in particular the U.N., the OAS and
CARICOM to work with the people of Haiti in a long-term effort to promote
the rebuilding of democratic institutions and to assist in the development
of a strategy to promote social and economic development and to combat
3. Situation in Haiti
While conditions in Haiti are neither as dire nor dangerous as in Afghanistan
or Iraq, the vacuum of governance and the scale of appalling human misery
is a reproach to the hemisphere and to the principal donor nations.
Haiti is in the bottom tier of the UN Human Development Index. Ranked
150 out of 175 countries surveyed it sits below countries such as Sudan
and Bangladesh. The next closest country in the Americas is Nicaragua,
which is ranked at 121. It is estimated that one of every twelve Haitians
has contracted HIV/AIDS and a ten year forecast sets the number of orphaned
children at approximately 350,000. Transnational crime is a grave issues.
Haiti is a major drug transhipment point. A U.S. DEA spokesman estimates
that close to 21 per cent of cocaine leaving Colombia for the US and
Canada passes through Haiti. Guy Phillipe, one of the leaders of the
insurgency, has been under investigation by US Drug Enforcement Agencies.
Money from the drug trade fuels lawlessness, weakens governance and
increases instability. Without a competent functioning government in
Haiti these problems, and their impacts on Canada and the region, will
become more severe.
Given the chaos of the last several months all of these statistics are
worsening. Haiti has not been neglected by donor agencies, humanitarian
assistance has continued to flow, but the country is a notorious sinkhole
for foreign aid. A recent World Bank study indicated that 15 years of
development assistance have produced "no noticeable effect".
It is not the purpose of this paper to determine to what extent this
situation is selfinflicted.
Without question, governance has been incompetent, corrupt and frequently
brutal over the 200 years of independence and these adjectives can all
be applied to the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide.In fairness it
should be recalled the birth of a black republic was not welcomed by
the international community of the time. Soon after independence in
1804, Haitians were compelled to pay crippling 'reparations' to France.
A slave owning United States imposed a trade embargo that remained in
some form for almost a hundred years.
Frustration with Haitian performance, followed by international censure
and punishment, was the pattern for the next hundred years. Withholding
aid to leverage reform has failed - invariably reversing the little
progress achieved during periods of international support.
4. Rebuilding Haiti
The old models for the rehabilitation of Haiti have failed. This paper
recommends that a new model should be examined. In our view its major
components should be:
Long-term commitment. The UN Secretary General has called for a commitment
of ten years. This is emerging as the minimum commitment subscribed
to by principal
international and bilateral donors based on examination of the most
recent State building exercise in Haiti and lessons learned from Kosovo
and East Timor. Canada should support this consensus.
Support not control. Most State building as well as traditional development
programmes now stress the importance of local 'ownership'. For example,
'Afghan solutions for Afghan problems' was a mantra of the preparations
for Afghanistan's reconstruction. But, Development is notoriously supply-
rather than demand-driven process as some donors seek to advance national
interest, including pushing pet causes carried out by favoured NGOs.
Canada is in a strong position to advocate a more rational developmental
approach and stress the prioritization of the development of Haitian
Trust fund and donor support. Donors should be encouraged to pool funds
support an interim Haitian government into a trust fund managed either
international organization or a private firm. A board including Haitian,
UN and major
donor members would oversee the fund and sign off on disbursements.
Such a fund
would encourage fiscal responsibility on the part of the new regime
and offer incentive for the more rapid development of institutional
capacity in government ministries. Also, evidence from Afghanistan and
elsewhere shows that donors actually disburse only about 60 per cent
of promised aid. A trust fund would help with planning in Haiti.
Sustained commitment and leadership. It is well known from experience
and elsewhere that commitment erodes and funding declines as the crisis
precipitated international engagement fades from media attention. This
situation has been avoided only when a major donor nation has taken
on the responsibility to lead and sustain the initiative, as did Australia
in East Timor and Norway in Sri Lanka.
This is not something that the United Nations has proven able to do
by itself. The US will be the main donor, but with other more pressing
responsibilities and a troubled history in Haiti, it appears to be actively
seeking another nation to assume leadership on Haiti. Canada is a natural
candidate. Brazil already has committed troops to the planned long-term
UN peacekeeping force. But , it is unlikely that Brazil would be able
to offer the political leadership to guide UN intervention. Again, Canada
has the credentials.
Security. No progress on any front is possible without the restoration
and maintenance of security and the rule of law. The first step to restoring
order and the rule of law is to move to arrest the leaders of the armed
insurgency, for whom criminal charges are already outstanding. Foreign
military and police units should remain until they can be gradually
replaced by adequately trained local constabulary. Recalling frustrated
Canadian experience in the nineties, equal attention must be given to
the parallel establishment of a reasonably reliable judicial and penal
system. While Brazil will assume primary peacekeeping duties, Canada
could take the lead in providing long-term support to the rebuilding
of the police and justice system.
International and Multilateral Support. Discussions in Washington indicate
plans for a
tripartite UN/OAS/CARICOM international framework. The World Bank, the
American Development Bank, the US, Canada, France and the EU should
be invited to subscribe to sustained funding over a ten-year period.
Canada should continue to take the lead at the UN and other international
bodies in promoting wider support for the effort in Haiti. CIDA is already
addressing the issue of Hispaniola wide (including the Dominican Republic)
planning on environmental and cross border issues.
Bosnia/Dayton, E Timor, Cambodian political models. The present interim
government in Haiti is non-elected, exercises almost no control over
the territory, lacks popular support and its legitimacy is questioned
in Haiti and the region. Discussions on re-establishing the State in
Haiti should reflect a new model including agreement between the international
community (OAS/UN/CARICOM) and the interim government to delegate authority
for a limited period for limited purposes to develop security and the
judiciary, to supervise the distribution of aid, to support municipal
governance and, rehabilitate essential services including health. The
agreement should include a timetable for the devolution of authority
and control to Haitians and supervising bodies should increasingly include
Haitian participation. The agreement should flow from UN Security Council
Elections. The 'model' should include approximate parameters for an
Given the chaotic political landscape, the error of a rush to elections
in Bosnia must be avoided. First elections should be at the municipal
The Haitian Diaspora. Due to out-migration and flight, there is an acute
competent professionals in every vital category throughout government
ministries and civil society organizations. Joint and independent CIDA
and USAID efforts are underway to incorporate the Haitian Diaspora in
the rebuilding process. Canada has long-standing experience in this
area and should continue to promote efforts to recruit qualified members
of the Haitian diaspora.
Urgency. With the crisis beginning to lose attention in Canada and elsewhere,
essential to move rapidly to obtain a commitment to a new model and
For example, CIDA and the
Provincial Ministry of Education
in Quebec could agree on a plan
for working with the Ministry of
Education in Haiti and would
draft a budget and assign a project
leader, ideally a Haitian-Canadian
who would be seconded from the
Ministry in Quebec. This person
could serve as deputy minister but
would report to the UN Special
Representative. In reviewing the
needs of the Education sector in
Haiti CIDA could decide that an
intensive intervention would be
needed for five years to bring the
Ministry of Education to a point
where it could work directly with
international donors and manage
the ministry. The relationship with
the Ministry of Education of
Quebec ideally would continue
either formally or informally past
this five-year period.
International experience has demonstrated that the concept of the 'ripeness'
circumstances is crucial to achieving agreements that are tough enough
to be viable.
International players have a short attention span.
5. Structure for Rebuilding.
In recent State building interventions, authority has typically flowed
from the Security Council to the Secretary General, who appoints a Special
Representative and a force commander. The Special Representative is
responsible to the Secretary General for all aspects of the intervention
as defined in the Security Council resolution. The force commander is
responsible for the military effort and may also have "command
and control" of the national military contingents deployed to support
the mandate. In some cases command and responsibility for executing
the mission can flow from the Security Council to a U.N. member state
or other organization, such as NATO.
This model should continue in Haiti where, the U.N. already has assigned
both a Special Advisor for Haiti and a force commander for a three-month
period with stipulations that longer-term arrangements be negotiated
at the end of this time.
The U.N. resolution also calls for the participation of the OAS and
6. Exit Strategy
A key factor in designing the structure and mechanisms is to plan for
the graduation of the Haitian State to independence and a return to
the international community.
This should be sequenced on a ministry-by-ministry basis - in other
return to full Haitian authority would depend not on a fixed date for
ministries, but on case-by-case basis of the institutional maturity
each ministry. The end of the UN Special Representative's tenure
would signal the formal end of the State building process.
Engagements with the line ministries could end earlier or later. In
essence, the Donor's Group would divide/assign responsibility and
funding for each ministry. The oversight and coordination for this
work would be done by the UN Special Representative
The primary goal would be to identify agencies in donor countries that
have significant resources, and especially those involving the Haitian
Diaspora, that could be seconded to work in Haiti to jump-start the
rebuilding process. The secondary goal in doing this is to build donor
confidence and attract the resources needed for reconstruction. The
third goal is to establish long-term relationships that could allow
continued, sometimes informal, transfers of knowledge and skills.
Under the UN programme, peacekeepers should remain for one to
three years while police would remain for up to 10 years. An initial
force of two to three thousand peacekeepers would be needed to
provide overwhelming force to disarm gangs and restore the rule of
law. Once this is accomplished the force could be reduced to 500
police advisors and trainers who would support the Haitian police.Peacekeeping
requirements will be lighter in Haiti than in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and
because the country lacks cadres of seasoned, trained, well-armed fighters.
Given time and improved narco-connections, armed gangs in Haiti could
develop into formidable gang bosses or warlords along the Jamaican and
Somali models. But organized Haitian gangs have not yet reached this
stage and one goal of this intervention is to prevent that scenario
from emerging. For peacekeeping to be effective the international community
must move decisively now to
disarm the population and then re-establish the police and
The key to successful disarmament is tying it to reconstruction in the
popular view. Those who hold weapons must be portrayed by the international
community, and must be understood by Haitians, to be impediments to
the resumption of aid,
rebuilding of the country and the creation of jobs.
Forwarded by the Haitian Lawyers Leadership
"Men anpil chay pa lou" is Kreyol for - "Many hands make
light a heavy load."
See, The Haitian Leadership Networks' 7 "Men Anpil Chay Pa Lou"
campaigns to help restore Haiti's independence, the will of the mass
electorate and the rule of law. See, http://www.margueritelaurent.com/campaigns/campaigns.html
and http://www.margueritelaurent.com/law/lawpress.html .
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